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HIS Article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas from October 1993 through
September 1994. The cases examined include decisions of courts
of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
I. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
A. RESERVATION OF MINERALS
Dickens v. Harvey2 involved the 1982 conveyance, from Rutten to Har-
vey, of 50 acres out of a 1162 acre tract, reserving "all mineral reserva-
tions, royalty reservations and/or mineral leases" in Rutten's chain of
title. The deed also stated: "No Minerals are transferred by this Deed."
Rutten had previously executed, in 1977, a coal and lignite lease on the
property and, sometime after 1982, had divided ownership of the miner-
als under the tract among Dickens and others (collectively, "Dickens").
In 1992, ten years after the conveyance to Harvey, Harvey sued Dick-
ens, asking the lower court for a declaratory judgment that his 1982 deed
conveyed, as part of the surface estate, the coal and lignite. Dickens
counterclaimed for reformation of the deed, claiming that the failure of
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney-at-Law, Alexander & McEvily, Hous-
ton, Texas.
** B.A., University of Kentucky, J.D., University of Louisville. Attorney-at-Law, Al-
exander & McEvily, Houston, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states, are
not included.
2. 868 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ).
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the 1982 deed to expressly reflect a. reservation of the coal and lignite to
Rutten was the result of mutual mistake.
Both Harvey and Dickens moved for summary judgment. The lower
court granted summary judgment for Harvey, declaring that: the 1982
deed to Harvey did, as a matter of law, convey the coal and lignite as part
of the surface estate; the reservation clause did not reserve any right, title
or interest in the coal and lignite to Rutten; and Dickens was not entitled
to reformation of the deed. The lower court denied Dickens' motion for
summary judgment that, without regard to the ownership of the coal and
lignite, the 1982 deed reserved, as a matter of law, the royalty interest
under the 1977 coal and lignite lease.
Relying on Acker v. Guinn,3 the Waco Court of Appeals held that a
grant or reservation of minerals or mineral rights is not to be construed to
include a substance that must be removed by methods that will consume
or deplete the surface estate unless a contrary intention is affirmatively
and fairly expressed. 4 The court then discussed the amplification of that
rule in later decisions of the Texas Supreme Court. It cited Reed v. Wylie5
(Reed 1), for the rule that the use of the word "mineral" in an instrument
is not construed to include the near surface substances absent an expres-
sion of that intent; and Reed v. Wylie6 (Reed 11) for the rule that coal and
lignite deposits within 200 feet of the surface are "near surface" as a mat-
ter of law. 7 The court describes the two-pronged test of Reed II as fol-
lows: "[A] person claiming ownership of coal and lignite as part of the
surface estate must prove either (1) that the substances lie within 200 feet
of the surface or (2) that their mining may substantially impair or destroy
the surface."8
The Waco court found that because the 1982 deed to Harvey stated no
express intention with respect to coal and lignite, it must apply the two-
pronged Reed 11 test.9 Finding that neither prong of the test had been
satisfied by Harvey, and that material issues of fact existed with respect to
where the coal and lignite were located and the impact of mining on the
surface, the court reversed the summary judgment insofar as it found that
the coal and lignite had been conveyed to Harvey as a matter of law, and
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings10
The Waco court then addressed Dickens' counterclaim for reformation
of the deed to expressly reserve the coal and lignite from the conveyance
3. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
4. Dickens, 868 S.W.2d at 439.
5. 554 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Tex. 1977).
6. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
7. Dickens, 868 S.W.2d at 439.
8. Id (citing Reed II, 597 S.W.2d at 747-48).
9. Id
10. Id. at 439-40. The court also briefly addressed Harvey's argument that the 1972
contract for sale underlying the 1982 conveyance required Rutten, as a matter of law, to
convey the coal and lignite. It stated that although Rutten might be subject to a suit for
breach of contract or reformation, he was not constrained from conveying the property in a
manner contrary to a contract for sale. Id. at 439.
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to Harvey. Holding the claim to be time-barred, it affirmed the summary
judgment that Dickens take nothing.1 The court cited Sullivan v. Bar-
nett12 for the rule that a grantor is charged with knowledge of all defects
in a deed, and Latham v. Richey13 for the rule that absent evidence of an
exception to the former rule, the four-year statute of limitations for refor-
mation of a deed begins to run on the date of the deed's execution. 14
While noting that mutual mistake is generally an exception to the rule of
immediate knowledge, 15 the court was persuaded by Harvey's summary
judgment evidence that Rutten knew of the mistake, if one existed, no
later than 1986.16 Consequently, the claim for reformation by Rutten's
successors, brought in 1992, had been time-barred since 1990.17
Finally, the Waco court reversed the lower court's denial of Dickens'
motion for summary judgment that, regardless of the ownership of the
lignite under Harvey's acreage, the 1982 deed reserved to Rutten, as a
matter of law, the royalties under the 1977 lignite lease.' 8 Distinguishing
the issue of whether the 1982 deed conveyed coal and lignite as minerals,
from the issue of whether the parties intended the terms "royalty reserva-
tions" or "mineral leases" to include the royalty under the 1977 lease, the
court held the rules of Reed II to be inapplicable.' 9 Applying general
rules for interpreting deeds, 20 the Waco court found the use of the term
"royalty reservation" in the reservation clause to unambiguously reserve
to Rutten the royalty under the 1977 coal and lignite lease.21
In French v. Chevron USA, Inc.,22 the court of appeals in El Paso was
asked to decide whether a deed conveyed a mineral interest with reserva-
tions, or conveyed a royalty interest.23 Affirming the summary judgment
of the lower court, the appellate court held that the deed transferred a
mineral interest with reservations.24
11. Id. at 440.
12. 471 S.W.2d 39, 45 (Tex. 1971).
13. 772 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
14. Dickens, 868 S.W.2d at 440.
15. Id. (citing Brown v. Harvard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1980)).
16. Id. at 441.
17. Id. The court relied on the fact that Rutten had been sued twice in 1986, in sepa-
rate lawsuits, on deeds and contracts virtually identical to the deed to Harvey and in which
the same or similar issues were raised. In one suit, Rutten had even counterclaimed for
reformation of the deed on the same legal basis pleaded by him in this action. Although
the two suits involved different parties and properties, the court found that Rutten had
knowledge of any mutual mistake, as a matter of law, no later than 1986. Id.
18. id.
19. Id. at 442.
20. Id (citing Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court cited Texas Co. v. Meador, 250 S.W. 148, 150 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't adopted), as holding that "royalty" and "royalty reservations"
have well-defined meanings, and must be given those meanings, unless a contrary meaning
is indicated by the context. Id.
21. Id.
22. 871 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ granted).
23. Id at 277.




The deed at issue read, in part, as follows:
That I, GEORGE CALVERT.... do grant, bargain, sell, convey,
set over, assign and deliver unto CAPTON M. PAUL, an undivided
Fifty (50) Acre interest, being an undivided 1/656.17th interest in and
to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, under and that may be
produced from the following described lands, situated in Crane and
Ward Counties, State of Texas....
It is understood and agreed that this conveyance is a royalty interest
only, and that neither the Grantee, nor his heirs or assigns shall ever
have any interest in the delay or other rentals or any revenues or mon-
ies received or derived or to be received or derived from the leasing
of said lands present or future or any part thereof, or the renewal or
extension of any lease or leases now on said lands or any part
thereof. Neither the Grantee herein nor his heirs or assigns shall ever
have any control over the leasing of said lands or any part thereof or
the renewal or extending of any lease thereon or for the making of
any lease contract to develop or prospect the same for oil, gas or
other minerals, which is hereby specifically reserved in the Grantor.25
The El Paso court first described the five essential attributes of a min-
eral estate in Texas: (1) the right to develop; (2) the right to lease; (3) the
right to receive bonus payments; (4) the right to receive delay rentals; and
(5) the right to receive royalty payments.26 The court then cited Extrac-
tion Resources, Inc. v. Freeman27 for the rule that each attribute consti-
tutes an independent property right, may be severed into a separate
interest, and may be separately conveyed or reserved by the owner,28 and
Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter,29 for the rule that when a mineral
owner conveys a mineral estate, all attributes are impliedly transferred
unless specifically reserved to the grantor.30
In holding that the deed conveyed a mineral interest with reservations
rather than royalty, the appellate court relied upon Altman v. Blake31 for
the rule that a deed provision reserving certain rights did not change the
character of a conveyance from a mineral estate to a royalty interest. 32
According to the El Paso court, under Altman, the words "this convey-
ance is a royalty interest only" cannot serve to create a royalty interest
without an express reference to royalties for actual production of miner-
als, words which were missing in the deed at issue.33 In addition, the
court cited a number of Texas cases decided prior to Altman for the rule
that a deed must refer to production in order to convey a royalty inter-
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id. (citing Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986), citing R. HEMMING-
WAY, LAW OF OIL AND GAS, §§ 2.1-2.5 (1971)).
27. 555 S.W.2d 156, 158-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. French, 871 S.W.2d at 278.
29. 786 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
30. French, 871 S.W.2d at 278.
31. 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986).
32. French, 871 S.W.2d at 278.
33. Id. at 278-79.
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est.34 Finally, the court relied upon the fact that the deed expressly re-
served leasing rights and delay rentals, noting that since royalty interests
do not carry these rights, there would have been no reason to reserve
them had the conveyance of a royalty interest been intended.35
Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co.36 involved the
interpretation of a 1937 "two-grant deed" 37 which contained a granting
clause conveying a 1/96 mineral interest and a subject-to clause describing
a 1/12 royalty interest in existing leases. The deed did not contain a
clause dealing with future leases. The primary issue was whether the
deed conveyed a 1/96 mineral interest, which was less than what the gran-
tor owned, or a 1/12 mineral interest, which was the full interest of the
grantor. The court held that the deed conveyed only part (1/96) of the
grantor's interest in the minerals, but all (1/12) of the grantor's interest in
the royalty under then existing leases. 38
On August 5, 1937 A. B. Crosby executed a deed to Southland Lease &
Royalty Corporation which provided:
That I, A.B. Crosby... do Grant, Sell and Convey unto Southland
... an undivided... (1/96) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and
other minerals ....
While the estate hereby conveyed does not depend upon the valid-
ity thereof, neither shall it be affected by the termination thereof,
this conveyance is made subject to the terms of any valid subsisting
oil, gas and/or mineral lease or mineral lease or leases on above de-
scribed land or any part thereof, but covers and includes... (1/12) of
all rentals and royalty of every kind and character that may be paya-
ble by the terms of such lease or leases....
In 1961 Pennzoil Exploration and Production Company and others re-
ceived from Crosby a conveyance of a 7/96 mineral interest. Concord Oil
Company succeeded to the rights of Southland.39
Concord argued that its predecessor in title, Southland, conveyed all of
Crosby's mineral interest as well as all of his royalty interest in existing
leases. Concord's argument was that under the "oil and gas notions that
prevailed during the 1920's and 1930's .... ." the parties used the fraction
of 1/96 to describe what portion of the oil and gas then being produced
was received by Crosby, which was "1/12 of 1/8 provided under the ex-
34. Id. (citing Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945); Grissom v.
Guetersloh, 391 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Etter v.
Texaco, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
35. Id.
36. 878 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ granted)
37. The court described a "three-grant deed" as one "with three blanks to be filled in:
one in the granting clause, one in the subject-to clause pertaining to existing leases, and
one in the future-lease clause." Id. at 193.
38. lit at 196. The court also held that the subject-to clause did not grant a full 1/12
interest in future leases, and that the deed was unambiguous which precluded extrinsic
evidence of intent. Id. at 197.
39. Id at 192.
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isting lease."'40 Although the court is not clear on the point, Concord's
argument apparently was that the uncertain state of mineral law during
that period, frequently chronicled by scholars and practitioners, together
with the circumstances of this transaction and the deed itself, demon-
strated that the deed was ambiguous as to what mineral interest was in-
tended to be conveyed.41
The court acknowledged the historical context in which the deed was
written and agreed that "most parties mean for... [a mineral] deed to
convey a single fractional interest in the minerals, the existing lease, and
future leases."'42 The court also agreed that the multiple-grant deeds de-
rived, not from a desire of the parties to convey different estates within
the same instrument, but from a misguided court decision, Carruthers v.
Leonard,4 3 which held that "a mineral deed did not convey an interest in
delay rentals (or presumably, the royalties) under an existing lease unless
there was express language of assignment.""4
The court held, however, that parties may convey different fractional
interests in one instrument,4 5 and that in this case, the deed did convey
different fractional interests in the minerals and royalty. The court's rea-
soning was that a "two-grant deed", which could be read within the "four
corners" 46 and which contained no future lease clause, traditionally had
been held to convey separate estates, and that "[t]he public interest in
certainty of land titles is overriding and paramount. ' 47
The court cited Garrett v. Dils Co. 48 and Pan American Petroleum
Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co.4 9 in support of its conclusion that
40. Id. at 193.
41. Although the court states that it did not consider extrinsic evidence, it notes that
the conveyance to Crosby one day before, on August 4, 1937 conveyed 1/12 of the minerals
and 1/12 of the royalty. Id. at 196 n.7.
42. Id. at 194 (citing Ernest E. Smith, The "Subject To" Clause, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. § 15.02[1] (1985); Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant
Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 91 (1993); Terry I. Cross,
Conveyancing-From Repugnance to Harmony-The Demise of Alford v. Krum, in STATE
BAR OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, ADVANCED OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW COURSE
F, F-1 (1992)).
43. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't adopted).
44. Concord Oil, 878 S.W.2d at 193. But it should be noted that in Carruthers, the
court held that delay rentals were not included in the conveyance of the minerals, but were
instead "paid for the privilege of drilling anywhere on the surface of the land .. and did
not arise from ... any of the minerals in which ... [the mineral purchaser J ... bought a
one-half interest, and is not, in any manner, connected with those minerals." Carruthers,
254 S.W. at 782-83. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the Carruthers court would have
recognized a transfer of delay rentals by anyone other than the surface owner. See also
Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1943), in which the Texas Supreme
Court overruled Carruthers, stating that the proposition that delay rentals were owned by
the surface owner "was clearly erroneous, as ... [the mineral owner] had every right to the
surface of this land necessary to enforce and enjoy his mineral title that ... [the surface
owner] had for the same purpose." Id. at 306.
45. Concord Oil, 878 S.W.2d at 192.
46. Id. at 194.
47. Id. at 195.
48. 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957).
49. 340 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-E! Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
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there has existed a "two-grant theory of interpreting deeds"50 which "has
been part of Texas law for at least half a century. '51 Based upon that
theory, the court concluded that "both fractions in this deed must be
given effect because there is no express future-lease clause to conflict
with the granting clause."'52
The court acknowledged that its ruling may not have reflected "the
parties' subjective intent"53 and that the "two-grant" doctrine may not
"comport with what the parties probably intended .... ,,54 But the court,
having held that the deed was unambiguous, refused to consider the par-
ties' subjective intent, pointing out that Concord had not sought reforma-
tion and that the issue was "interpretation of the deed as written, not
reformation to reflect subjective intent.155
B. ASSIGNMENTS OF MINERAL INTERESTS
In Robbins v. HNG Oil Co.56 the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed
a summary judgment construing a December 14, 1911 deed to real prop-
erty from Ephriam Garonzik to James Meaders.57 Abigail Meaders,
plaintiff and appellant, through her attorney-in-fact, Jewell Robbins,
claimed title, as an heir of James Meaders, to four tracts of land specifi-
cally described in the 1911 deed and to thirty-seven additional tracts of
land not specifically described in the deed. Claiming a one-eighths inter-
est in the oil, gas and other minerals, she sought an accounting from de-
fendant HNG Oil Company, and others,58 for unpaid royalties. Robbin's
claim to the additional tracts was based upon language in the 1911 deed
which stated that the property conveyed was all of the property that J. H.
McFaddin, R. D. McFaddin and A. J. McFaddin inherited through their
ancestor, William McFaddin. The thirty-seven additional tracts, although
not described in the deed, were alleged to have been part of the William
McFaddin estate and therefore conveyed by the deed.
The Beaumont court addressed four points of error raised by Robbins.
The first point of error alleged that the lower court erred in construing
the deed to convey only the four specifically described tracts of land,
rather than all tracts which were part of the William McFaddin estate.
Finding that Robbins had not raised the issue of ambiguity of the deed in
the lower court, the appellate court held that the meaning of the deed
50. Concord Oil, 878 S.W.2d at 195 (citing Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59,273 S.W.2d 617
(1954); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id at 194.
54. Id. at 195.
55. Id. at 194.
56. 878 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ dism'd. w.o.j.).
57. Id at 353.
58. The other defendants were Elf Aquitiane, Inc., IMC Exploration Company, Pogo
Producing Company and Westland Oil Development Corporation.
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was a question of law for the court. 59 The court cited Lewis v. East Texas
Fin. Co.60 for the rule that it may not consider even the circumstances
surrounding the transaction when the instrument is unambiguous and
Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co.61 for the rule that a party's intention,
however discovered, cannot contradict or destroy the legal effect of the
wording and language used.62 Relying on the case of Coffee v. Manly,63
the court held that the specific descriptions of the four tracts in the 1911
deed controlled over the reference to the source of the interest in the four
tracts.64 The court stated:
The [Coffee] court held that where a recitation was made to another
deed or another record for the purpose of showing from what source
the real property had been derived and as a help in tracing the title,
then such a reference or referral will not and could not operate to
enlarge the specific description given in the deed which contained
the reference.65
The first point of error was, therefore, overruled. 66
The court also rejected Robbin's second point of error, contending that
the appellees' summary judgment evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law to support the judgment granted in the lower court.67 The court de-
scribed Robbin's argument under this point of error as follows:
As briefed by the appellant, this point of error two deals only with
the issue of which properties were conveyed. First the appellant con-
cedes that the interpretation of real property descriptions is normally
a matter exclusively for the court; nevertheless, the appellant further
argues that when there is an uncertainty in the description that does
not appear on the face of the deed but had its origin in extraneous
fact or an ambiguity, then the identity of the land becomes a mixed
question of fact and law and must be determined by a jury.68
In overruling this point of error, the Beaumont court concluded that the
four tracts were not described with uncertainty and that the 1911 deed
was not ambiguous.69 In connection with her second point of error, Rob-
bins also apparently complained of: (1) the failure by defendants to sub-
mit summary judgment evidence of nonownership and nonproduction of
minerals on the thirty-seven tracts of land not actually the described in
1911 deed; and (2) the lack of such evidence by defendant Pogo Produc-
ing Company with respect to all tracts, including the four tracts specifi-
cally described by the deed. Given its prior ruling that the deed did not
59. Id. at 354 (citing Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Management Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193
(Tex. 1962)).
60. 136 Tex. 149, 146 S.W.2d 977 (1941).
61. 11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, holding approved).
62. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 354.
63. 166 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, writ ref'd).
64. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 355.
65. Id. at 354-55.
66. Id. at 355.
67. Id. at 356.
68. Id. at 355.
69. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 355.
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convey any tracts other than the 'four specifically described tracts, the
court found it unnecessary to address the alleged lack of evidence in con-
nection with thirty-seven of the tracts.70 As to the lack of a nonowner-
ship and nonproduction affidavit by Pogo Producing Company in
connection with the four described tracts, the appellate court held that
Meaders had failed to prove her chain of title to three of the four de-
scribed tracts of land. She failed to prove her claim of title because these
tracts had not been included in the inventory of William McFaddin's es-
tate.71 As to the remaining tract, the court held that an affidavit filed by
an owner of a title company, stating that he could not locate any instru-
ment granting any interest in that tract to any defendant, and did not
know of any oil and gas production on the tract, was sufficient to uphold
the summary judgment in favor of Pogo Producing Company.72
The court's conclusions that the 1911 deed conveyed only four tracts of
land, that Robbins established a proper chain of title only to one of those
four tracts, and that there was no evidence of either production of miner-
als or of ownership of the remaining tract by any defendant, in fact dis-
posed of all of the issues in the case. The El Paso court, however,
engaged in a lengthy discussion of the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res
judicata and stare decisis.
Robbins was also the plaintiff in two federal court cases decided by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, styled Robbins v. Amoco Prod. Co.73 and
Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co.74 The Beaumont Court of Appeals thus
stated: "We determine that the doctrine of collateral estoppel properly
applies and is a correct basis for one of the separate, independent
grounds for the granting of the motion for summary judgment. ' 75 The
court rejected Robbin's argument that a lack of mutuality of parties
should have defeated defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
ground of collateral estoppel.76 In this regard, the court relied upon Ea-
gle Properties Ltd. v. Scharbauer,77 for the rule that the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel applies where the party against whom it is asserted was a
party, or in privity with a party, in prior litigation.78 Noting that Robbins
was a party in both prior federal cases, 79 both in her individual capacity
and on behalf of 200 heirs of James Meaders, the court stated: "In this
State [sic] litigation [Robbins] is suing as the attorney-in-fact for Abigail,
as the heir of James Meaders. Therefore, we conclude that Abigail is in
70. Id. at 356.
71. Id. at 362.
72. Id. at 356-57, 363.
73. 952 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1992).
74. 908 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1990).
75. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 357.
76. Id.
77. 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990).
78. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 357. The court also cited Myrick v. Moody Nat'l Bank, 590
S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardy v.
Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tarter v.
Metropolitan Sav. & Loan Ass'n.
79. Id. at 357-58.
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privity with the two hitndred heirs of the same James Meaders inasmuch
as she claims directly under James Meaders. . . ."80 Although the holding
is probably correct, the court cited no authority for the rule that privity
necessarily exists between all heirs of a common ancestor.
In addition, the court seemingly added a new factor to be considered in
determining whether a claim is barred by collateral estoppel, i.e., "an
identity of lawyers at crucial times."'' l The court stated:
It is significant and important that in the Federal [sic] court suit that
Robbins as plaintiff both in the trial court and as appellant in the
appeal was represented by the legal professional who has repre-
sented Robbins in the case at bar at the time the summary judgment
for the defendants was granted. 82
The court concluded that the federal and state cases involved identical
issues of law, and that those issues were actually litigated in federal court
and were essential to the judgment.8 3
Finally, the court also upheld the lower court's summary judgment in
favor of defendants under the doctrine of stare decisis,8 and what the
court referred to as "the [d]octrine of [i]ssue [p]reclusion a/k/a
[p]reclusion by [j]udgment. 85
II. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. LEASE COVENANTS
Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises86 was a trespass to try title case filed by
the plaintiffs under a partial assignment of an oil and gas lease to recover
possession of a working interest in a 329.3 acre tract. In general, the is-
sues were presented as attacks on plaintiff's proof of superior title out of
a common source. The supreme court, in a divided opinion,87 reversed
the trial court and the court of appeals and held that plaintiffs had proved
their title.
In 1937 an oil and gas lease from Dean to Wiggins covered 793 acres
(base lease), and provided for a primary term of ten years and "as long




84. Id. at 361 (citing Case-Pomeroy Oil Corp. v. Pure Oil Company, 279 S.W.2d 886
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, writ ref'd)).
85. Id (citing Van Dyke v. Boswell, O'Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.
1985); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980)). The court was presuma-
bly referring to the doctrine of res judicata. The court stated: "We hold in this case that it
is correct to give effect to the holdings, judgments, and opinions of the Fifth Circuit Court
[sic]." Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 362.
86. 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994). This is the fourth appellate opinion written in this
dispute. See 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989), 775 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ
granted), and 852 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ granted) for the previous
opinions. See also James V. Hammett, Jr. and Deborah E. Taylor, Oil, Gas and Mineral
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REv. 1439, 1453 (1994).
87. Id. at 770. Inexplicably, the majority and dissent broke out into the all-too-familiar
teams common to personal injury actions.
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thereafter as oil and gas ... is produced .... ,,88 The lease provided that
after expiration of the primary term, and upon cessation of production,
the lessee would have sixty days within which to commence operations.
The lease was assignable in whole or in part and provided that if the
leased premises" 'shall hereafter be owned in the severalty or in separate
tracts, the premises, nevertheless shall be developed . . . as one
lease .... ' "89
Production was promptly obtained on the lease and continued through
all times material to the case, thereby keeping the base lease alive. On
June 1, 1949, Superior Oil Company (Superior), which had acquired the
base lease by assignment, assigned a leasehold interest in 329.3 acres out
of the 7893 acres upon which there was no production to Western and
others. The assignment required Western to drill a well within thirty
days, failing which the assignment would "cease and terminate and...
revert to and revest in Superior... -90 Western also agreed to assume all
"express and implied base lease obligations. . ." and recognized that
"there now are a number of ... offset wells which Western shall protect
against by the drilling of properly located wells on the... land." 91
The assignment also provided:
5.
In the event that the production of oil, gas ... is developed ... and
Western desires to abandon or cease operating the same, Western
shall notify Superior ... and Superior may, at its election, require
Western to transfer and assign to Superior... all of Western's right
... to said lease....
6.
Upon termination of the rights of Western hereunder and/or with
respect to the ... lease ... or otherwise, Western shall deliver to
Superior upon demand, a good and sufficient quit-claim deed and
release. Any delay.., of Western to deliver any such quit-claim and
release shall in no way prevent such rights from terminating, and re-
verting to and revesting in Superior as herein expressly provided and
contemplated .92
Western promptly drilled a producing well. During the life of the well,
in August 1960, E. P. Campbell, the president and a stockholder of West-
ern, in his individual capacity only, sold, assigned, and transferred to Da-
kota Company, Inc. (Dakota)93
all of the right title and interest ... as conveyed to [him] by Assign-
ments of record [including conveyance of] all of [his] right, title and
interest ... in [the base lease] ... insofar as said lease covers the ...
329.3 acres ... subject to the exceptions, reservations and provisions
88. Id at 764.
89. Id.
90. Rogers v. Ricane, 772 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1989).
91. Id at 78.
92. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 765-66.
93. Id. at 765, 769. Campbell was also an officer and director of Dakota. See Rogers,
852 S.W.2d at 755.
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.*. stated, but all without warranty of any kind, either expressed or
implied.94
Though the assignment refers to previous conveyances to Campbell,
neither the instruments nor evidence sufficient as a substitute were intro-
duced. Through a series of conveyances thereafter, Ricane Enterprises,
et al. succeeded to the rights of Dakota and in October 1979, drilled a
successful well.
The early well, which had been drilled on the 329.3 acres, ceased pro-
duction in July 1961, and no drilling activity or production had occurred
after that date until the Ricane well in 1979. Campbell died in 1961 and
in 1965 Western's charter was forfeited by the State of Texas for non-
payment of franchise taxes. A former Western director and shareholder
testified that he wound up Western's affairs and that it was insolvent, but
he did not testify as to the title to the working interest.
The plaintiffs, who were stockholders and other successors to the assets
of Western, filed suit in 1984 against Ricane in trespass to try title for
possession of the 329.3 acres. Following the successful appeal by the
plaintiffs of a summary judgment for defendants, the case was tried to a
jury which answered eighteen different issues. Among them were find-
ings that Western had "abandoned or ceased operating" the premises and
that Western had "abandoned the purposes" of the assignment.95 The
trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiffs and the
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the lease had terminated in
light of the jury's finding of abandonment of purpose.96
Ricane first attacked the plaintiff's title by arguing that the assignment
terminated by its own terms under its paragraphs 5 and 7, because of
Western's failure to transfer the premises back to Superior.97 The court,
however, held that paragraph 7 was "triggered [only] upon failure of
some other provision leading to termination of Western's rights...." and
that the only condition which could lead to automatic termination of the
assignment was a failure to drill the initial well within 30 days.98
Ricane also argued that under the doctrine of Texas Co. v. Davis,99 the
assignment had automatically terminated, either because of abandon-
ment or because the purpose of the assignment had ceased with cessation
of production. The court reaffirmed the Davis doctrine, but distinguished
it because "the assignment in this case does not, by its express terms,
specify a purpose for the assignment and does not contain any language
94. Id. at 769.
95. Rogers, 852 S.W.2d at 759.
96. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 765.
97. Id. at 766. Apparently, Superior sent two letters to Western in 1966 demanding a
reassignment because of the cessation of production. Superior, however, did not sue to
enforce its rights and was never made a party to this litigation. Id. at 770.
98. Id. at 766.
99. 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304 (1923). The court also cites W.T. Waggoner Estate v.
Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27, 29 (1929) in which the court distinguished the
theories of abandonment of title, which Texas does not recognize, and the cessation of use
of an oil and gas lease doctrine established by Davis. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 767.
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limiting the duration of the assignment to 'as long, as' oil and gas is pro-
duced."'1 Finding that Davis did not control, the Court held that the
finding of abandonment of purpose was immaterial.
The court further found that provisions for termination in the base
lease did not control the rights of Rogers and Ricane and that the assign-
ment, which did not clearly and unequivocally create a conditional estate,
did not contain an implied determinable fee. 01 The court also noted that
even if a drilling purpose were implied, the appropriate remedy wotild be
an action for breach of that implied covenant, and not automatic
termination. 0 2
Ricane also argued that Rogers had failed to prove a superior title as
required in a trespass to try title case.' 0 3 Ricane's first point was that
Rogers had failed to prove a regular chain of conveyances into plaintiffs,
because in some way (and the court is not clear on this), Western's title
disappeared in the wake of its insolvency and the forfeiture of its char-
ter.' 4 The court held, however, that upon forfeiture of the charter, the
shareholders of the company became trustees of its property for the ben-
efit of its creditors' 0 5 and that no showing of a transfer of title out of the
shareholders had been made. 10 6
Ricane's second point was that Rogers had failed to prove a superior
title, because Ricane's assignment from Western, coming earlier in time,
was superior. The court, however, held that the assignment from Camp-
bell to Dakota was nothing more than a quitclaim, conveying title only if
Campbell held title, and that Ricane had failed to prove that Campbell,
individually, held any title to the 329.3 acres.10 7
Ricane also argued a "reverse alter ego doctrine" theory, to the effect
that in executing the assignment to Dakota, Campbell was de facto the
company, Western. The court refused the argument and held that
100. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 767.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. While the parties agreed that the method of proving title in this case would be by
superior title from a common source, the court noted that other available methods of prov-
ing title in a trespass case were by proving a regular chain of conveyances from the sover-
eign, proving title by limitations, or by proving prior possession, not abandoned. There
was no need for Rogers to prove common source due to Ricane's agreement that both
parties derived whatever title they held from Western, the common source. Id. at 768.
104. Id. at 769.
105. Id. at 768.
106. Id. at 769. If unpaid creditors of Western still exist, it would seem that the now
successful stockholders of the defunct company would remain trustees of its assets, subject
to applicable limitations statutes, if any.
107. Id at 765. The court notes that if Campbell's assignment had contained a war-
ranty, his heirs, who were also plaintiffs in the Rogers group, might have been estopped to
assert trespass to try title. Id. at 769 n.5 (citing Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d
270, 271-72 (1942)). Other than its possible effect on Campbell's heirs, it is difficult to see
how a warranty could have affected the result in this case. Once the issue of termination
was decided, Ricane could argue no more than that Western breached its covenants in the
Superior assignment, a position which only Superior could assert in the absence of other
pleading such as third party beneficiary entitlement. See San Antonio Loan & Trust Co. v.
Rabb, 155 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, writ ref'd. w.o.m.)
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"[b]ecause Campbell executed the instrument in personal capacity, and
the instrument itself does not reflect that Campbell purports to act on
behalf of Western, the reverse alter ego theory does not apply." 10 8 The
court further held that there was no evidence that Western ratified Camp-
bell's assignment.10 9
Finally, Ricane argued that division orders issued by Superior recog-
nized its title, thereby in some way creating title in Ricane. The court
held, however, that "[w]hile a division order can create a contractual rela-
tionship, it does not transfer title" and that "division orders do not re-
place or invalidate the original assignment."' 1 0
Rogers had also sued for conversion of its runs for the period of time
since the Ricane well was drilled in 1979. The court of appeals had not
considered those points, so the supreme court remanded the case to the
appeals court.
The dissent argued that the Davis case should control the result. Tak-
ing issue with the majority's position that in order for Davis to control,
there must have been an express statement of purpose in the Superior
assignment, the dissent argued that the absence of express language of
purpose did not mean that the contract had no purpose."1 Further argu-
ing that the purpose was for exploration, development and production of
oil and gas, the dissent concluded that "a complete failure to pursue that
purpose-'not a partial use, nor a negligent use, nor an imperfect use, but
cessation of use'1 2 is an abandonment of the purpose, which terminates
the estate.""13
J.M. Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe Energy Resources, Inc." 4 involved the
construction of four oil and gas leases between J.M. Huber or Mobil Pro-
ducing Texas and New Mexico, Inc., as lessees, and Santa Fe Energy Re-
sources, Inc., as lessor. The clauses at issue concerned the payment of
taxes and came in two forms. The earlier lease forms read:
It is expressly agreed that during the life of this lease Lessee shall
pay all taxes of every kind lawfully levied or assessed upon or against
all or any part of the minerals in or under said land and/or the pro-
duction thereof, including gross production and severance taxes and
transportation taxes, and all increases in taxes on the land resulting
from the prospecting for and discovery and/or production of miner-
als therefrom.1 5
The more recent lease forms read:
108. Id. at 769.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 770.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 770-71 (citing Waggoner Estate, 19 S.W.2d at 29).
113. Id. But see the majority's argument, citing Waggoner Estate, 19 S.W.2d at 32, that
courts should not find that a lease has been forfeited or terminated upon breach of an
implied obligation. Id at 767.
114. 871 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
115. Id. at 843, n.1.
1436 [Vol. 48
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW
During the life of this lease, Lessee shall pay all taxes of every kind
lawfully levied or assessed upon or against all or any part of the oil
and gas in or under said Leased Premises and/or the production
thereof, including gross production, severance and transportation
taxes, and all increases in taxes on the Leased Premises resulting
from the prospecting for, discovery or production of oil and gas
therefrom.116
The disputed tax was the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.117
The lessees had withheld from royalty payments to Santa Fe the amount
of the windfall profit tax due and had remitted the tax to the United
States government. Santa Fe maintained that the leases shifted the bur-
den of paying the windfall profit tax to the lessees and filed its action for
a declaratory judgment that payment of all windfall profit taxes were,
under the express lease provisions, the burden of the lessees. The lessees
contended that the lease provisions did not apply to the windfall profit
tax and that the suit was expressly barred by federal law and by explicit
lease provisions. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of
Santa Fe, and the lessees appealed.
The appellate court first discussed Santa Fe Energy Co. v. Baxter,"8
which it cited for the rules that the determination of the character of the
windfall profit tax was a matter of state law, and that the tax was similar
to an excise or severance tax which may be shifted to an oil and gas lessee
under an appropriate tax shifting provision in a lease. 1 9 The court was
unpersuaded by the lessees' argument that Baxter was wrongly decided
and should be overruled on the basis that the court is "bound by the
decisions of lower federal courts regarding construction of this federal
taxing act.' 20
Relying upon Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc.,121 Barstow v. State,122 and
Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 23 the appellate court held that only
the opinions of the United States Supreme Court are controlling in a
state court on federal matters; the opinions of lower federal courts are
persuasive, but not binding. 124 The court expressly rejected the argument
that Holmes v. Olson125 requires Texas courts to follow federal court de-
cisions, stating:
In construing its own opinion in Olson and the supreme court's per
curiam opinion refusing application for writ of error, the Austin
court of appeals noted that they did not intend to hold that state
116. Id. at 843.
117. 26 U.S.C. § 4986(a) (repealed 1988).
118. 783 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
119. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 845-46.
120. 1& at 846.
121. 805 S.W.2d 498, 505 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
122. 742 S.W.2d 495, 501 n.2 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
123. 865 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1993).
124. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
125. 587 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979).
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courts are bound by lower federal court opinions, but that such deci-
sions are entitled to due weight and consideration. 126
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals then refused to hold that two deci-
sions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required the overruling of its
decision in Baxter.127 It was not persuaded by Tenneco West, Inc. v. Mar-
athon Oil Co. 128 even though the Ninth Circuit, interpreting a similar tax
shifting provision, held that the burden of payment of the windfall profit
tax was not shifted to the lessee.129 Finding that the Ninth Circuit de-
cided the case on the basis of California rather than federal law, the Four-
teenth Court of Appeals stated: "The [Ninth Circuit] relied on a
[California] state law case 130 containing an almost identical clause which
held that such a clause did not encompass the windfall profits tax.' 31
Consequently, it found that the Ninth Circuit's later characterization of
the tax as an incremental value tax rather than an excise tax was purely
dictum. The court dismissed the other Ninth Circuit case, Exxon Corp. v.
City of Long Beach,132 as relying entirely on Tenneco West.133 Finally, the
appellate court also held that the decisions of Texas courts in Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell,134 Cities Service Oil Co. v. McCrory,135 Fain-
McGaha Oil Corp. v. Murko Oil & Royalty Co.,136 and Felber v. Sklar Oil
Co.,137 to be inapplicable as involving "free of all cost" provisions rather
than tax shifting provisions.' 38
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals also rejected the arguments of Mobil
Producing Texas and New Mexico, Inc. that Santa Fe's action was barred
by federal law and by explicit provisions of the leases. 139 It held that
Mobil was not immune from the action under 26 U.S.C. section
4995(a)(1)(B) because the lease expressly shifted the liability for payment
of the windfall profit tax to Mobil.140 The court also held that payment of
the windfall profit tax did not constitute payment to Santa Fe under 26
U.S.C. section 4495(a)(4), providing that the producer of any crude oil is
treated as having paid any amount withheld under the subsection, be-
126. Id. at 846 (citing Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 505 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1991, writ denied)).
127. Id. at 846.
128. 756 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1985).
129. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
130. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. McFarland Energy, Inc., 140 Cal. App. 3d 6, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (2d Dist. 1983).
131. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
132. 812 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1987).
133. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
134. 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd).
135. 191 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, no writ).
136. 128 Tex. 646, 101 S.W.2d 547 (1937).
137. 235 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, writ ref'd).
138. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 847.
139. Id. at 847-48.
140. Id at 848. Mobil relied upon Robinson v. A & M Electric, Inc., 713 F.2d 608 (10th
Cir. 1983). Id.
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cause the parties had agreed that it was Mobil, and not Santa Fe, who
owed the tax.' 4 '
Finally, and with little explanation, the court held that the leases them-
selves did not bar Santa Fe's suit by providing that they are subject to all
valid federal law, rules and regulations, because the tax shifting clauses
do not require a violation of the laws; and that the clauses do not defeat
the congressional purpose of the tax by allowing Santa Fe to receive the
windfall that Congress sought to tax since the parties agreed to the
clauses.142
Kiewit Texas Mining Co. v. Inglish143 was a dispute as to the proper
damages to be awarded for the repudiation and anticipatory breach of a
coal and lignite lease by the lessors, Kiewit Texas Mining Company and
Phillips Coal Company.'" The lease had a primary term of twenty-five
years, but was repudiated in 1989, the twelfth year of the primary term.
As damages, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs the present value of all
annual advance royalties which would have been due had Kiewit honored
the lease for the thirteen years remaining in the primary term, and the
present value of a twelfth and a twenty-fifth year bonus provided for by
the lease. The Waco Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of lower
court, finding that plainitiffs were entitled only to the value of the ad-
vance royalties for the years 1989 and 1990, and to the twelfth year bonus
due in 1989.145
The lease was signed in June 1977. However, no coal or lignite was
ever produced or mined on the leased acreage. In addition to a "produc-
tion royalty," the lease provided for an annual "advance royalty," which
was not related to production, and the bonus payments. The clauses on
bonus payments stated, in part:
In the event that mining operations have not been commenced by
Lessee hereunder prior to the fifth anniversary date hereof (June 28,
1982), Lessee shall pay or tender to Lessor, within thirty days after
said fifth anniversary date, an additional bonus consideration for this
Lease equal to [$100] per acre....
Upon the twenty-fifth (25th) anniversary date of this Lease and if
this Lease is to be extended by other provisions herein, then this
Lease shall then terminate unless, on or prior to such date, Lessee
shall pay Lessor a sum of money equal to [$5001 per acre (represent-
ing a $400.00 per acre additional bonus, and the $100.00 per acre
advance royalty for the succeeding year under paragraph 4 of this
Lease).... If such payment is made then this Lease shall continue in
force and effect as provided by other provisions of this Lease.' 46
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 865 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
144. Id. at 242. On appeal, the defendants conceded a breach and repudiation of the
lease and so limited the appeal to questions of damages. Id
145. Kiewit Mining, 865 S.W.2d at 247.
146. Id at 242-43.
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The lease provided for a right of surrender, as follows:
Lessee may at any time from this date execute and deliver to Lessor
or place of record a legally sufficient release covering all of the
Premises and thereupon terminate this Lease as to all of the Prem-
ises. Lessee shall thereupon be released from all further obligations
and duties as to the Premises so released, including any obligation to
make advance royalty payments described in paragraph 4, except ob-
ligations accrued as of the date of surrender .... 147
However, the right to surrender the lease was restricted as set forth
below:
Attached to this Lease, as Exhibit "D", is a list of Coal Leases, ex-
cluding this Lease, all naming Lessee as the mining lessee thereun-
der, all covering tracts of adjacent lands. Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraphs 11 and 14 hereof, Lessee may not release
any of the Premises covered hereby or assign this Lease unless and
until it likewise executes, delivers, and records like releases or as-
signments covering all lands conveyed by the leases tabulated in Ex-
hibit "D". This provision shall have no application to releases
subsequent to the completion of mining and reclamation. 148
Finally, the lease addressed termination by either party:
Termination of this Lease under any paragraph or on account of
any circumstances or event or on account of the fault, option, or ac-
tion of any person, entity, or party shall be subject to this subpara-
graph 11(f) and its subparts.
(iii) Termination of this Lease shall in no way diminish or termi-
nate the obligations of Lessee to make any payments to Lessor as
may then be due or accrued or as may become due before such ter-
mination becomes effective and such termination shall not entitle
Lessee to demand return of any amounts paid to Lessor prior to such
termination, including, but not limited to, unearned advance
payments.149
On appeal, Kiewit argued that the lease terminated in 1989 when the
plaintiffs' accepted the repudiation of the lease, 150 and that under the ex-
press terms of the lease, no obligation for future payments ever accrued.
In addition, Kiewit contended that there was a failure of conditions pre-
cedent to their obligation to make future payments under the lease. The
plaintiffs contended that the trial court properly awarded them the pres-
ent value of all payments that could have have been due under the terms
of the lease.
The Waco Court of Appeals first held that the lease language was clear
and unambiguous, and did not limit or specify the type of damages that a
147. lt at 243.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 244.
150. The case was tried to the trial court, who concluded that Kiewit repudiated the
lease on June 28, 1989 and that the plaintiffs accepted that repudiation. Neither conclusion
was apparently challenged on appeal. Id. at 244.
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non-breaching party can recover. 15' The court therefore rejected the ar-
gument that the lease, by its own terms, prohibited the recovery of pay-
ments after its repudiation or termination.152 The court also rejected the
argument that no royalties or bonuses were due after the repudiation and
termination of the lease in 1989, stating that the breach by Kiewit did not
modify or cancel the lease obligations. 153 The court then found that
plaintiffs' right to damages after the breach depended upon whether the
conditions on which the obligation were based occurred, or if not, were
excused. 54
The court defined a condition precedent as "those acts or events, which
occur subsequently to the making of a contract, that must occur before
there is a right to immediate performance and before there is a breach of
contractual duty.' 55 The appellate court held that payment obligations
under the lease were dependent upon at least two conditions; the obliga-
tion to pay advance royalties was conditioned upon the lease being in
force on its anniversary date and the obligation to pay the twenty-fifth
year bonus was conditioned upon extension of the lease beyond the pri-
mary term.156 The court held that after the breach of the lease by Kiewit,
neither of the necessary events occurred. 157
The court noted that the non-occurrence of a condition is excused
when a party's repudiation contributes materially to its non-occurrence,
but is not excused where the condition would not have occurred under
any circumstances. 158 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs could
not recover annual advance royalties or the twenty-fifth year bonus un-
less they pleaded and proved that the necessary conditions would have
occurred but for the breach by Kiewit. 159 The court then examined the
record for plaintiffs' evidence of the value of the expected performance.
As to the obligation to pay the twenty-fifth year bonus the court found
that the evidence conclusively established that the lease would not have
been extended beyond the primary term.' 6° Therefore, there would have
been no obligation to make the payment even if no breach occurred, and
so the twenty-fifth year bonus was not lost as a result of the breach.
As to payments of advance royalties, the court held that the plaintiffs
had proved that the failure of the condition precedent to the payment of
advance royalties was excused for the year 1990, because Kiewit had ma-
151. Kiewit Mining, 865 S.W.2d at 244.
152. 1&
153. Id. at 245 (citing Newman v. San Antonio 1Taction Co., 155 S.W. 688, 690 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, no writ)).
154. Id.




158. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACrs § 255 (1981)).
159. Id. (citing City of Fort Worth v. Rosedale Park Apartments, 276 S.W.2d 395, 397
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ ref'd); Howell v. Kelly, 534 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ)).
160. Id. at 245-46.
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terially contributed to the non-occurrence by breaching the lease.' 61 The
court then held that there was no evidence that the lease would have
been in effect after 1990 even had there been no breach by Kiewit, how-
ever, and held that the non-occurrence of the condition precedent to pay-
ment of advance royalty was not excused for any year after 1990.162
The court apparently relied on the fact that in 1991 Kiewit released all
of the Exhibit "D" leases, and then released the disputed lease, thereby
complying with the voluntary surrender provision of the lease.163 The
court noted that the law will not allow Kiewit to rely upon advantageous
lease provisions after breaching that lease, 16' and stated that its holding
should not be interpreted as implicitly giving effect to the surrender pro-
vision of the lease.' 65 The court reasoned that it was the surrender of the
Exhibit "D" leases which conclusively established that the lease at issue
would not have remained in effect after 1990, and not the surrender of
the breached lease itself.' 66
It should be noted that the appellate court devoted considerable effort
to the question of the proper measure of damages for breach of the lease,
and held that damages for the anticipatory repudiation of a lease are the
same as damages for any breach of any contract, i.e., those damages nec-
essary to compensate the innocent party for the damages actually sus-
tained.' 67 The amount necessary to compensate the plaintiffs was held,
however, to be the expected value of performance of the lease, as op-
posed to the face value of the contract. 168 The court rejected the plain-
tiffs' argument that Pollack v. Pollack'69 entitled them to the face value of
the contract. 70 The Pollack court stated: "[The plaintiff] is entitled in
one suit to receive in damages the present value of all that he would have
received if the contract had been performed.'' a17 The court declined to
adopt what it termed a literal interpretation of the quoted language from
161. Id. at 246.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 246 (citing Baker Marine Corp. v. Weatherby Eng'g Co., 710 S.W.2d 690, 696
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
165. Id. at 247.
166. Id. However, this reasoning is not persuasive. The lease allowed Kiewit to surren-
der the lease voluntarily, and had it done so, Kiewit could have avoided any subsequent
payment obligations during the remainder of the primary term of the lease. It did not
surrender the lease, however, but instead chose to breach its payment obligation to plain-
tiffs. To relieve Kiewit of liability for advance royalty payments during the primary term of
the lease, upon proof that it would have surrendered the lease anyway, is to allow Kiewit to
take advantage of the instrument it breached and is a wrong result, without regard to the
specific nature of the proof.
167. Id. at 245 (citing Walter H.E. Jaeger, 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRAC'rs § 1397 (Baker
Voorhis, 3d ed. 1968)).
168. I1& (citing P. G. Lake, Inc. v. Sheffield, 438 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981)).
169. 39 S.W.2d 853 (Tex Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
170. Kiewit Texas, 865 S.W.2d at 246.
171. Id. at 245 (quoting Pollack, 39 S.W.2d at 855).
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Pollack, concluding that the plaintiff in that case was allowed to collect, in
fact, only the anticipated performance of the contract. 172
B. SURFACE/MINERAL RELATIONSHIP
In Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement Dist.
Number One 73 the subject of dispute was whether the district's flooding
of an eighty-acre tract to create a lake was an inverse condemnation 174 of
the minerals under that tract. In an opinion remanding the case to the
Waco court, 175 the Texas Supreme Court had established the "law of the
case" to be that the "accommodation" or "alternative means" doctrine 76
must be considered "in determining whether inverse condemnation has
occurred when a governmental entity that owns the surface restricts the
mineral owner's surface use."'1 77 The supreme court having also held that
there was legally sufficient evidence to support the invocation of the ac-
commodation doctrine, the issue before the court of appeals was whether
there was factually sufficient evidence. 178 The court held that while there
was sufficient evidence to support a trial court finding that there were
alternative means of accessing the minerals, the evidence was insufficient
to support a finding that those means were reasonable alternatives.
The "accommodation" or "alternative means" doctrine was established
by the Texas Supreme Court in Getty Oil v. Jones:179
[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the estab-
lished practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the
[mineral owner] whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alter-
native by the [mineral owner]. 180
The doctrine recognizes, however, that if there is only one means of sur-
face use by which the minerals may be produced, the mineral estate, be-
ing the dominant estate, has the right to produce the minerals regardless
of damage to the surface. 181
The burden of proof was on the surface owner "to show that the partic-
ular manner of surface use being... [proposed by the mineral owner] is
172. Kiewit Texas, 865 S.W.2d at 245-46.
173. 870 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ).
174. "Inverse condemnation occurs whenever property is 'taken' or 'damaged' for pub-
lic use without adequate compensation." Id. at 351.
175. Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement Dist. Number One v. Haupt,
Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993).
176. Haupt, Inc., 870 S.W.2d at 353.
177. Id. at 352. Until the Texas Supreme Court's opinion, the accommodation doctrine
had never been extended to a governmental surface owner in an inverse condemnation
proceeding. Id at 353. And the court notes that the subject was not raised by either party
until the case was in the supreme court. It
178. Id The Texas Supreme Court also held that the Water District could "only use the
surface estate as a reservoir by flooding the surface." Haupt, Inc. 854 S.W.2d at 912.
179. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).




not reasonably necessary to the mineral owner under all circum-
stances... ." which may be done "by proving that the mineral owner has
available other reasonable means of production... that will not interfere
with the surface owner's existing use."'182
After examining the water district's proof, the court held that the evi-
dence was factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the
mineral owners had alternative means of accessing the minerals, 183 such
as directional drilling and platform drilling. But the court failed to find
sufficient evidence that those alternatives were "reasonable":
Assessing the reasonableness of a particular means of production,
especially in the context of an inverse condemnation proceeding,
must include its impact on the value of the mineral estate .... If, as
here, a mineral owner has available several means of accessing the
minerals, one of which will maximize the value of the mineral estate
and other alternatives that, if used, will either totally destroy or re-
duce its value by three-fourths, one cannot logically or rationally ar-
gue that the alternative methods provide reasonable access to the
minerals.184
Finding that the record "clearly shows" that the only method of drilling
which would preserve the value of the mineral estate was by drilling a
vertical well on dry land, the court remanded the case for new trial. 85
C. ROYALTY INTERESTS
Atkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht 86 was an appeal by a lessee-operator
(Atkinson) from a trial court judgment for the mineral-royalty owners
(Albrecht) declaring that Atkinson's lease had terminated due to cessa-
tion of production and awarding damages in the amount of a bonus lost
by Albrecht when Atkinson refused to release his lease. 187 The case had
been tried to the court and judgment entered for Albrecht, apparently
without findings of fact or conclusions of law. The court of appeals
affirmed.
The lease was executed in 1985, provided for a one-year primary term,
and contained a sixty-day cessation of production clause. Atkinson
drilled a gas well which was produced in accordance with the lease terms
until December 9, 1991 when Albrecht and Atkinson's well gauger shut
in the well because of Atkinson's failure to make timely payments, re-
spectively, of royalty and wages. Albrecht notified Atkinson that " '[tihe
182. Id An additional burden of the surface owner, which was met as a matter of law
(See Getty Oil, supra note 180, at 623) was to show that "any alternative uses of the sur-
face, other than the existing use, are impracticable and unreasonable under all the circum-
stances." Id.
183. Haupt, Inc., 870 S.W. 2d at 355.
184. Id at 354.
185. Id. at 355.
186. 878 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
187. The only question on appeal involving the damage award was one of evidence and
will not be discussed.
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well was shut in today. No pay-No Gas!' 188 Atkinson, however, disre-
garded the note, because the pipeline purchaser, through error, continued
to report the gas as flowing at a reduced rate and continued to pay rents,
including royalties, to Atkinson. 189
On January 22, 1992 the Railroad Commission sealed the well due to
Atkinson's failure to file production reports, making production physi-
cally impossible. On March 18, 1992 Albrecht requested that Atkinson
release the lease under the sixty-day cessation of production clause. Two
days later, on March 20, 1992 the Commission order was lifted and the
well commenced flowing. In April 1992 Atkinson paid and Albrecht ac-
cepted royalty payments for 1991 and 1992, which erroneously included
payments for those days when the well was shut in.
Atkinson argued that by shutting in the well, Albrecht repudiated the
lease, thereby relieving him of any obligation to conduct operations on
the land in order to maintain the lease. 190 The court, however, held that
there had not been a "clear, unequivocal challenge to the lessee's title to,
and interest in the lease . .." and that Albrecht's actions did not amount
to a "lockout" which prevented Atkinson physically from entering the
lease to resume production.' 91 Finding that Atkinson was "generally free
to turn the well back on," the court held that Albrecht's actions "failed to
rise to the level of preventing Atkinson from producing or repudiating
the lease."'192
Atkinson also argued that Albrecht's actions in shutting in the well and
in accepting erroneous royalty payments for the shut-in period estopped
him from asserting that the lease had terminated. Recognizing that the
doctrine of "quasi-estoppel" operates to prevent one from accepting the
benefits of a transaction only to thereafter take an inconsistent position
to avoid corresponding obligations, the court nevertheless held that
"[a]lthough it may have been improper for Albrecht to inconvenience
Atkinson . . ." by shutting in the well, "it was not inconsistent with Al-
brecht's subsequent claim that cessation of production for the requisite
period terminated the lease.' 93 The court concluded that Albrecht's
188. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 238.
189. It is common for a gas purchaser to make all payments to an operator such as
Atkinson, who is then obligated to make royalty payments to the mineral owners.
190. Atkinson relied upon Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex. 56, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1957), and
other cases.
191. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 239. But see Morriss v. First Nat. Bank of Mission,
249 S.W.2d 269, 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.), (holding that the
non-payment of royalty does not terminate a lease, in the absence of a specific clause to
that effect). While Albrecht's actions in shutting in the gas for non-payment of royalties
were arguably a breach of the lease, or at least were an interference with the lessee's oper-
ations, the court in Atkinson does not characterize those actions other than to state that
there was neither a repudiation nor a lockout. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 239.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 240. There is nothing in the court's opinion as to whether any credit could or
should have been given for the length of shut-in time attributable to Albrecht's actions.
Without question, some period of the shut-in time prior to the Commission's sealing of the
well was necessarily used in arriving at lack of production for more than sixty days.
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conduct did not amount to a "ratification, election, acquiescence, or ac-
ceptance of benefits, as have traditionally been considered the type of
conduct which may form the basis of a claim of quasi estoppel.' '194
The court further held that Albrecht's acceptance of the erroneously
paid royalty payments for the shut-in period would not estop him from
asserting that the lease had terminated. 195 The court reasoned that "the
position or conduct which is the basis for the estoppel ... [must] have
been taken before the assertion of the position sought to be estopped."' 196
Albrecht having asserted that the lease had terminated, which was the
conduct sought to be estopped, prior to the acceptance of the royalty pay-
ments, precluded Atkinson's assertion of estoppel.197
Atkinson also argued that Albrecht's acceptance of the erroneously
paid royalties was actually an acceptance of shut-in royalties which ex-
tended the life of the lease. Finding no proof in the record of intent to
pay shut-in royalties, or that they were the proper amount, and observing
that in any event, they were paid after expiration of the lease, the court
held that no shut-in royalties were paid. 198
Finally the court held that the force majeure clause of the lease was not
triggered by the Commission's sealing of the well, because the Commis-
sion's actions were the result of Atkinson's failure to comply with Com-
mission regulations, and were not the result of "circumstances beyond the
reasonable control of the lessee .... 199
III. JOINT OPERATIONS
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Norman v. Apache Corp.,200 was
called upon to construe, as a matter of law, several provisions of a joint
operating agreement covering oil and gas working interests located in
Brazoria County, Texas.
In 1977, Dow Chemical Company drilled and completed the Sue and
Dwight Brothers No. 1 Well on oil and gas leases which were subse-
quently pooled with other acreage and unitized into production units.
The Sue and Dwight Brothers Well was the only well on the Brothers Gas
Unit, and the leases within the unit were maintained only by production
from that well. In 1976, prior to the completion of the well, the owners of
the working interests in the leases had executed a joint operating agree-
ment, giving Dow the exclusive control of the oil and gas operations on
the subject leases. In 1982, Apache Corporation took over operations of
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 240.
197. Id. The court does not mention ratification as a contractual theory, but it should
be noted that a key element of that theory, to-wit, knowledge by Albrecht, both of the fact
of termination and of the receipt of royalties for the shut-in period, was established.
198. Id at 241.
199. Id.
200. 19 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1994).
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the Brothers Gas Unit, subject to the terms of the original 1976 operating
agreement.
Apache continued to operate the Brothers Well until July of 1990. At
that time, Apache ceased production from the well and Apache employ-
ees prepared paperwork showing the well to be "uneconomical to pro-
duce"201 and "not expected to return to production. ' 20 2 In September
1990, Apache filed with the Texas Railroad Commission a notice of inten-
tion to plug and abandon the Brothers Well, and in late December of that
year, recommended to the working interest owners that the well be
plugged and abandoned. The owners requested that Apache continue to
operate the Brothers Well, but then learned that operations had ceased as
of July 1990 and that the leases formerly held by production from the well
had been lost. The working interest owners filed suit in 1991, alleging
that Apache breached contractual and fiduciary duties under the joint
operating agreement by failing to give them advance notice of its decision
to plug and abandon the well; by failing to take reasonable actions to
prevent the lapse of the Brothers Unit leases; by failing to notify them of
cessation of production from the well; and by misrepresenting to them,
through the sending of monthly billing statements, that it continued to
operate the well after July 1990. The trial court granted a summary judg-
ment in favor of Apache on all claims, and the owners appealed.20 3
The appellate court first held that the lower court correctly found that
the working interest owner's complaint did not allege sufficient facts to
support a claim of fraud against Apache. 204 The Fifth Circuit then con-
sidered whether Apache was entitled to summary judgment on its claims
of breach of fiduciary duty. Apache argued that neither the joint operat-
ing agreement nor the circumstances surrounding its relationship with the
owners could give rise to a fiduciary duty; and that in fact, a letter agree-
ment between the parties expressly negated the existence of a fiduciary
relationship.
Applying Texas law, 20 5 the court found that the letter agreement relied
upon by Apache addressed the relationship between Apache and the
owners only as it concerned potential liabilities or obligations to third
parties.2°6 The letter agreement did not, therefore, proscribe the creation
201. Id at 1019.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1021. The trial court granted its summary judgment on the original complaint
filed by the working interest owners, after having found that an amended complaint filed
by the owner, alleging additional causes of action, was not timely filed. The Fifth Circuit
also refused to consider the amended complaint. Id. at 1022.
204. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1022 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and relying upon Haber Oil
Co. v. Swinehart Co. (In re Haber Oil Co.), 12 F.3d 426, 439 (5th Cir. 1994) and Shushany
v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1993)).
205. The case was in federal court on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 1023-24.
206. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1024. The pertinent language in the letter agreement stated:
The obligations and liabilities of the parties hereto shall be several and not
joint or collective, and each party shall be responsible only for his or its obli-
gations in accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement. This
agreement does not constitute or create a joint venture or partnership, min-
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of fiduciary duties.207 The court then cited a number of Texas cases208 for
the proposition that unless specifically set out in the operating agreement,
a fiduciary relationship does not arise between the operator and working
interest owners by virtue of the contractual joint operations; however,
such a relationship may arise from a special relationship between the par-
ties, such as a partnership, agency, or confidential relationship.2°9 Be-
cause the owners did not assert a partnership or agency relationship with
Apache, the court examined the summary judgment evidence for a fact
issue with respect to whether a confidential relationship may have existed
between the parties. Without defining the elements or nature of a confi-
dential relationship, the court noted that not every relationship involving
great trust and confidence is fiduciary in nature, that evidence that a rela-
tionship is cordial and of long duration does not evidence a confidential
relationship and that mere subjective trust alone is not enough create a
confidential relationship.210 The court then held that the owners had
failed to raise a fact issue with respect to the existence of fiduciary duties
and so affirmed the holding of the lower court on that issue.211
The court next considered the owners' breach of contract claims
against Apache. The Fifth Circuit held that the section of the joint oper-
ating agreement which addressed delay rentals and shut-in gas well pay-
ments applied only to the temporary, and not to permanent, cessation of
production from a well.212 Noting that the provision of the joint operat-
eral or otherwise, or association, or agency or a fiduciary relationship of any
kind or character whereby any party hereto shall become liable for the acts
and deeds of any other party hereto....
Id
207. Id. at 1024.
208. See Crowder v. Tri-C Resources, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Taylor v. GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908, 911-12
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.,
648 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Crim Truck & Tractor v.
Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992); MacDonald v. Follett, 142
Tex. 616, 180 S.W.2d 334, 337-38 (1944).
209. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1024-25.
210. Id. at 1025 (citing Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 823 S.W.2d
591, 595 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962)).
211. Id. at 1026.
212. Id. at 1027. With respect to delay rentals and shut-in payments, the joint operating
agreement provides:
Operator shall pay all delay rentals and shut-in well payments which may
be required under the terms of all leases covered by this agreement and sub-
mit evidence of each payment to the other parties. Each party shall notify
the other, in writing, at least thirty (30) days prior to the date any rental
payment is due, as to whether or not it elects to participate in the payment
thereof. In the event either party elects not to participate in a rental pay-
ment, and the other party elects to participate therein, then the party desiring
not to participate shall promptly execute and deliver to the party desiring to
participate in such rental payment an assignment of such non-participating
party's right, title and interest in and to such lease, or leases, and such lease,
or leases, shall no longer be subject to this agreement. The amount of such
payments, when made for the account of both parties, shall be charged by
Operator to the joint account of the parties. Operator shall not be liable to
the other party in damages for the loss of any lease or interests therein if,
1448 [Vol. 48
OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW
ing agreement which governs abandonment of wells imposes no contrac-
tual duty by the operator to notify working interest owners of an intent to
abandon or permanently cease production from a well,213 and citing
Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,214 the court affirmed the lower court's
judgment with respect to the owner's claims of breach of contract for
failure to notify the owners of the abandonment of the Brothers Well.215
Finally, the court considered the owners' claims that Apache failed to
act as a reasonably prudent operator. Noting that Texas courts have de-
termined that "in the context of a joint operating agreement, the require-
ment that Apache conduct all operations-as permitted by, required by,
and within the limits of the agreement-in 'a good and workmanlike
manner' means that Apache has a duty to perform such operations 'as a
reasonably prudent person engaged in drilling oil wells,' i.e., as a reason-
ably prudent operator. ' 216 Relying upon Johnston v. American Cometra,
Inc. ,217 the Fifth Circuit rejected Apache's claim that its obligation to per-
form in a good and workmanlike manner extends only to the operations
expressly required by the joint operating agreement and does not create
any independent duties.218 After reviewing the summary judgment evi-
dence, the court concluded that Apache had not proved, as a matter of
law, that it acted as a prudent operator under the specific circumstances
through mistake or oversight, any rental or shut-in well payment is not paid.
There shall be no adjustment of interests of the parties in the remaining por-
tion of the Unit Area in the event of a failure to pay, or erroneous payment
of rental or shut-in well payments. If any party secures a new lease covering
the terminated interest, such acquisition shall be subject to provisions of Sec-
tion 23 of this agreement.
Operator shall promptly notify each party hereto of the date on which any
gas well located on the Unit Area is shut in and the reason therefor and the
date on which said well is restored to production.
Id
213. Id. at 1027. With respect to abandonment of wells, the joint operating agreement
provides, in pertinent part:
No well, other than any well which has been drilled or reworked pursuant to
Section 12 hereof for which the Consenting parties have not been fully reim-
bursed as therein provided, which has been completed as a producer shall be
plugged and abandoned without the consent of all parties; provided, how-
ever, if all parties do not agree to the abandonment of any well, those wish-
ing to continue its operation shall tender to each of the other parties its
proportionate share of the value of the well's salvable material and equip-
ment ... less the estimated cost to salvaging and the estimated cost of plug-
ging and abandoning. Each abandoning party shall then assign to the non-
abandoning parties, without warranty, express or implied, as to title or as to
quantity, quality, or fitness for use of the equipment and material, all of its
interest in the well and its equipment, together with its interest in the lease-
hold estate as to, but only as to, the interval intervals of the formation or
formations then open to production. ...
Id.
214. 872 F.2d 655, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1984).
215. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1029.
216. Id. at 1029 (quoting Johnston v. America Cometra, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied)).
217. 837 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
218. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1030.
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of the case, and therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court on
this issue and remanded for further proceedings.219
IV. GAS TRANSPORTATION CONTRACTS
In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n,220 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an order of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which prohibited Ten-
nessee Gas Pipeline Co. from making certain rate changes under a 1991
gas transportation contract with Flagg Energy Development
Corporation.221
In 1988 and 1989, Tennessee entered into agreements with seven differ-
ent companies, including Flagg, for the transportation of natural gas to
points in the Northeast. In connection with those agreements, Tennessee
sought FERC approval to construct and operate new pipeline facilities,
and to transport gas to Flagg through new pipeline segments designated
by Tennessee as segments U, 2 and 3, and to charge Flagg at rates set
forth on a Rate Schedule known as NET-EU. FERC approved the con-
struction of segments 2 and 3, among others, in May of 1990. In that May
1990 order, FERC denied Tennessee's request to charge Flagg for any use
of segments which had not yet been approved, but stated that Tennessee
could seek to amend its NET-EU rates to include the costs associated
with new segments after they were approved and placed in service.
In 1991, Flagg and Tennessee entered into a "Firm Natural Gas Trans-
portation Agreement," which referred to, and was specifically based
upon, the May 1990 order. The contract set out a specific rate formula
for transporting the gas and also provided that Tennessee had the unilat-
eral right "to file and make effective changes in the rates, charges, and
conditions applicable to service. '222 Subsequently, Tennessee filed a lim-
ited rate case under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act223 (NGA) to revise
the rates in its NET-EU rate schedule and, among other requests, sought
to charge Flagg and another company for use of the segment U pipeline.
Flagg intervened in the rate case, contending in part that its 1991 con-
tract with Tennessee allowed Tennessee to charge it for the use of seg-
ments 2 and 3, but not for the use of segment U. In an expedited paper
hearing, the FERC found the contract to be clear and unambiguous and
determined that it did not allow Tennessee to charge Flagg for the use of
the segment U pipeline.
219. Id. at 1031. Note, however, that Judge Eugene Davis dissented in part, arguing
that a letter from Apache to plaintiffs established that Apache was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, that it did not breach its obligation to perform in a good and workmanlike
manner by failing to notify the owners of its intent to terminate production of the Brothers
Well. Id. at 1031-32. The letter, however, does not notify the plaintiffs of an intent to plug
and abandon the well. Instead, it states Apache's reasons for refusing to plug and abandon
as of that date.
220. 17 F.3d. 98 (5th Cir. 1994).
221. Id. at 99.
222. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 100.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1988).
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The Fifth Circuit first determined that the case must be decided on the
basis of the specific wording of the contract. 224 The court relied upon the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp.,225 for the rule that the NGA does not allow
natural gas companies to unilaterally change rates established by valid
contract, and that court's decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mem-
phis Light, Gas and Water Division,226 for the rule that natural gas com-
panies may seek unilateral changes in their rates unless a contract
expressly precludes them from so doing.227 In other words, a natural gas
company may always seek to alter its rates, unless there is a contractual
obligation not to do so. Consequently, the court looked solely to the con-
tract language used by Flagg and Tennessee to determine Tennessee's
right to seek a change in the rates charged under the contract.
The court rejected Flagg's argument that it should defer to FERC's
construction of the 1991 contract.22 Declaring it well-settled law within
the Fifth Circuit that the court will "review the construction of natural gas
contracts freely, ' 229 it cited Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n and El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Comm'n for the rule that it will defer to FERC's construction of
natural gas contracts only where FERC has applied its factual or techni-
cal expertise in reaching a conclusion. Finding that FERC did not rely on
such expertise, the court reviewed the construction of the contract de
novo.
230
Again relying on Mid-Louisiana Gas,231 the federal court stated that it
should apply the normal rules of contract construction in interpreting a
natural gas contract.232 It held that Texas law233 requires that a court
review an entire contract to determine its meaning, and that meaning,
effect and purpose are to be given to each word in the contract if possi-
ble.234 The appellate court then reviewed the two contract provisions pri-
marily at issue.
The contract read, in part, as follows:
8.2. Transportation Rates-Beginning on the Commencement
Date, the compensation to be paid by Shipper to Transporter for the
transportation service provided for herein shall be payable monthly
224. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
225. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
226. 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
227. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
228. Id. at 102.
229. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 881 F.2d 161,
164 (5th Cir. 1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d 1128, 1135-
36 (5th Cir. 1986).
230. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
231. 780 F.2d at 1242-43.
232. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
233. See Eagle Life Ins. Co. v. G.I.C. Ins. Co., 697 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 103 (citing TM Prod., Inc. v. Nichols, 542 S.W.2d 704,
708 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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in accordance with Article X hereof and shall be equal to the sum of
the following: (a) the product of (1) the sum of the "D-1" charges
for Segments 2 and 3 under Transporter's NET-EU Rate Schedule
and (2) the Transportation Quantity, (b) the product of (1) the sum
of the "D-2" charges for Segments 2 and 3 under Transporter's NET-
EU Rate Schedule and (2) the "D-2 Billing Determinant" for the
applicable billing period as set forth in Exhibit B hereto, (c) the
product of (1) the sum of the "Commodity" charges for Segments 2
and 3 under Transporter's NET-EU Rate Schedule and any applica-
ble surcharges as included in Transporter's effective FERC Gas
Tariff and (2) the quantity of gas delivered by Transporter to Shipper
during the applicable billing period.
References herein to Transporter's NET-EU Rate Schedule shall
include any successor or substitute rate schedules....
8.4 Rate Changes-Shipper agrees that Transporter shall have the
unilateral right pursuant to this Article VIII to file and make effective
changes in the rates, charges, and conditions applicable to service
pursuant to the Rate Schedule under which this service is rendered
and/or any provisions of the General Terms and Conditions of Trans-
porter's FERC Gas Tariff Volume No. 1 as such Tariff may be re-
vised or replaced from time to time. Without prejudice to Shipper's
right to contest such charges, Shipper agrees to pay the effective rate
for service rendered pursuant to this Agreement, subject to FERC
review and adjustment.235
FERC had construed the two sections to mean that Tennessee's right to
file revised rates under section 8.4 was limited, by use of the phrase "pur-
suant to this Article VIII," to the segments of pipeline referred to in sec-
tion 8.2. FERC argued that "pursuant to" is a restrictive phrase meaning
"in conformance or agreement with" or "according to."'236 FERC rea-
soned that section 8.2 allowed charges only in connection with segments 2
and 3, and not in connection with segment U. If section 8.4 must be read
in conformance or agreement with section 8.2, section 8.4 did not allow
Tennessee to revise its rates to include charges not provided for in section
8.2, therefore excluding any charges for segment U.
The Fifth Circuit was unpersuaded by both FERC's interpretation of
"pursuant to" and its construction of the contract. 237 The court noted
that the contract sets forth a formula for charging for the use of segments
2 and 3 based on four variables.238 The dollar amount of each variable is
not determinable by reference to the contract, but requires reference to
the NET-EU Rate Schedule, which the contract defined to include any
successor or substitute rate schedules. 239 Finding that all references to
the NET-EU Rate Schedules in section 8.2 necessarily included revised
235. Id.
236. FERC cited BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1236 (6th ed. 1990).
237. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 104.
238. Id.
239. Id. The opinion does not set out the specific contract language on which the court
relied.
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or changed rate schedules, the court held that FERC's interpretation
would turn the language of section 8.4 into "mere surplusage." 240 As to
the meaning of the phrase "pursuant to," the court held that the defini-
tion relied upon by FERC effectively eviscerated section 8.4 from the
contract.241 The court also noted that the definition of "pursuant to" re-
lied upon by FERC was limited to its use in a statute. 242 The court found
the proper meaning of "pursuant to" was "in carrying out" or "in the
course of carrying out."243 Finally, the court found its construction of
section 8.4 to be consistent with other contract provisions.244
Flagg also contended that the contract should be read to allow Tennes-
see to revise "charges" for segments 2 and 3, but not overall gas transpor-
tation rates, such as adding charges for segment U, and that the word
"rates" was employed by the parties in a technical sense. In rejecting
these arguments, the Fifth Circuit found that such a reading would, again,
completely negate section 8.4, and render the word "rates" superflu-
ous. 245 The court also held that there was no evidence that the word
"rates" was used in any technical sense and concluded that its construc-
tion of the contract did not make section 8.2 meaningless, but instead
rendered its provisions temporary; i.e., effective only until Tennessee





243. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 104-05 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DicrnoN-
ARY 930 (1979) and BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990)).
244. Id. at 105. In particular, the court found that the "pursuant to" language in section
8.4 was intended to remove Article VIII from the terms of section 16.1 of the contract
which prohibited modification of any term absent written consent by both parties. Id. at
105.
245. Id. at 105.
246. Id at 106. The court did not address whether the revisions attempted by Tennes-
see were in fact consistent with the NGA. Id.
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